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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Unlike many other creatures who are born with a 
set of instincts that equip them to deal with the world 
effectively, people enter the world almost completely 
helpless. The individual comes into the world ignorant 
and a great portion of his or her time is spent in learn-
ing. It is learning or more precisely, faulty, maladap-
tive, or incomplete learning that is the source of a great 
deal of what is problematic in life for the individual. 
R. W. White (1959) has stated that people have 
an innate drive to deal effectively with their environ-
ment. This drive for competence or effectance is in some 
ways akin to Alfred Adler's concept of "striving for 
superiority," which Adler posits as a basic drive in all 
people because of their initial inferiority or helpless-
ness (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1956). 
Abraham Maslow (1968), among others, has posited 
that one possible goal of this striving is "self-actual-
ization." However, the presence of this competence mo-
tivation or "striving for superiority" does not always 
lead to the successful realization of this goal. 
One important intervening variable which may 
1 
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account for a large portion of the failure to realize this 
goal may be the individual's expectations. 
Rotter's social learning theory (1954) specifies 
that the occurrence of a particular behavior (behavior 
potential) is a function of the individual's expectancy of 
reinforcement and the value of the reinforcement for that 
behavior. He defines expectancy as the probability held 
by the individual that a particular reinforcement will 
occur as a function of a specific behavior on his or her 
part. 
What Rotter is describing is an expectancy vari-
able and not a motivational one. The importance of this 
distinction is that given the possible universality of 
competence motivation, individual differences in actual 
behavior may in part be a function of one's expectations. 
The concept "locus of control" is a generalized 
expectancy variable derived from Rotter's social learn-
ing theory which reflects the perceived effectiveness of 
the individual's actions. Rotter (1966) distinguishes be-
tween two types of individuals on the locus of control 
continuum, externals who perceive reinforcements as de-
pendent on luck or on others and internals who perceive 
reinforcement as contingent upon what they do. He states 
that: 
the individual is selective in what aspects of his 
behavior are repeated or strengthened and what 
that 
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aspects are not depending upon his own perception of 
the nature or causality of the relationship between 
the reinforcement and the preceding behavior .••• 
If a person perceives a reinforcement as contingent 
upon his own behavior, then the occurrence of either 
a positive or negative reinforcement will strengthen 
or weaken potential for that behavior to recur in the 
same or similar situation. If he sees the reinforce-
ment as being outside his own control or not con-
tingent, that is depending upon chance, fate, powerful 
other, or unpredictable circumstances, then the pre-
ceding behavior is less likely to be strengthened or 
weakened (p. 5) • 
The results of this difference in perception are 
the individual who has a strong belief that he can 
control his own destiny is likely to (a) be more alert 
to those aspects of the environment which provide use-
ful information for his future behavior; (b) take 
steps as to improve his environmental condition; (c) 
place greater value on skill or achievement reinforce-
ments and be generally more concerned with his ability, 
particularly his failures; and (d) be resistive to 
subtle attempts to influence him (p. 25). 
Externals tend to develop and adapt poorly to 
their environment, while internals tend to learn more 
adaptive behavior and become autonomous. Internals are 
confident that they are in control of themselves and their 
destinies, while externals feel that they are pawns in the 
hands of chance, fate, or powerful others. 
Bandura (1977) also believes that expectancies 
play a critical role in differences in behavior. However, 
he distinguishes between what he calls "efficacy expecta-
tions" and "outcome expectations." The former represents 
the individual's belief that he or she may be able to per-
form some behavior, while the latter represents the in-
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dividual's belief that a given behaltior will lead to cer-
tain outcomes. Bandura characterizes locus of control as 
primarily concerned with causal beliefs about action-
outcome contingencies rather than with personal efficacy. 
However, while he believes that causal belief and self-
efficacy are different phenomena, he also thinks that 
causal ascriptions of behavior to skill or chance can 
mediate the effects of performance on self-efficacy. In 
other words, while these two beliefs are different, they 
are interrelated. 
Although Bandura has made important theoretical 
refinements, the thrust of this study will deal with the 
relationship between locus of control and interpersonal 
skills. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Familial Antecedents of 
Locus of Control 
The question arises as to the origins of this dif-
ference in expectancies. These differences can, in part, 
be accounted for in the developmental histories of in-
ternals and externals. The research seems to indicate 
that internals and externals were exposed to signif-
~ 
icantly different child-rearing practices. 
Chance (1965) matched children's scores on Cran-
dall's Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Question-
naire (an internal-external scale) with their mother's 
attitudes towards child rearing. The author found that 
internal control expectancies were related to permissive 
and flexible maternal attitudes and expectations of early 
independence. 
Katkovsky, Crandall, and Good (1967) also com-
pared children's scores on the Crandall scale with home 
observations of parental behavior and attitudes. Their 
findings indicated that internal control expectancies were 
related to parental protectiveness, nurturance, and the 
tendency to be approving and non-rejecting. Conversely, 
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parental behaviors such as dominance, rejection, and 
criticalness were negatively associated with beliefs in 
internal control. The researchers further noted that the 
largest number of significant results were obtained from 
behavioral observations and not with expressed parental 
attitudes. 
Davis and Phares (1969) also found that parents 
of internals were judged as being more accepting, less 
rejecting, having greater positive ~nvolvement, and ex-
ercising less hostile control than parents of externals. 
Also, parents of internals were perceived as being more 
consistent disciplinarians than were the parents of ex-
ternals. One other significant finding of the authors 
was that there were no significant differences between the 
expressed attitudes of parents of internals and externals. 
The difference was in their actual parenting behaviors. 
MacDonald (1971), using a large sample of col-
lege students, found that internality was positively cor-
related with perceived parental nurturance and consistency 
in maintaining standards for behavior. 
Finally, Epstein and Komcrita (1971) used a sample 
of black children and found that external attribution of 
success in a matching task was positively correlated with 
inconsistent parental discipline and hostile control. 
To summarize, the research seems to consistently 
indicate that internals tend to come from warm, accepting 
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homes with predictable standards and consistent discipline 
coupled with nurturance. Externals, on the other hand, 
tend to come from homes characterized as being higher in 
the use of physical punishment, overprotection, affective 
punishment, and generally inconsistent discipline. 
Finally Davis and Phares (1969) found that, while 
the parents of internal and external children may have 
similar attitudes toward child rearing, their actual child 
rearing behaviors differed significantly. One might there-
fore speculate that this difference in parental behavior 
may be reflecting the control orientations of the parent 
themselves. 
Sociological Factors and 
Locus of Control 
In addition to familial antecedents, there are 
definite indications that minority group status, socio-
economic status, and level of education, also play a role 
in the differing expectations of internals and externals. 
In one study, Battle and Rotter (1963) used the 
"Children's Picture Test of Internal-External Control," 
a projective task, the Bealer I-E (Internal-External) scale, 
and a live-matching task with eighty black and white chil-
dren from middle and lower class families. The authors 
found that lower-class blacks were more external than 
middle class black or whites and that middle class children 
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were, in general, more internal than lower class children. 
In another study, Lefcourt and Ladwig (1965a) in-
vestigated differences between blacks and whites in their 
control expectancies. The subjects were compared on three 
different I-E scales and a pertinent performance task. 
Blacks were found to be significantly more external than 
whites. The authors suggested that because of societal 
factors (for instance, discrimination) a large portion of 
the externality of blacks could be attributed to blacks' 
dubiousness about avenues open to them rather than doubts 
about their own adequacy. 
Several other researchers have also found that 
middle class children are more internal than lower class 
children (Gruen and Ottinger, 1969); that educational 
level is directly related to internality (Walls and 
Miller, 1970); and that socioeconomic status and objec-
tive access to societal opportunities is positively re-
lated to internality (Jessor, Graves, Hanson, and Jessor, 
196 8) • 
Some important methodical issues are pertinent to 
the societal antecedents of control expectancies. Rotter 
(1966) stated that the I-E scale was primarily measuring a 
unidimensional trait. However, more recent factor analysis 
suggests that the I-E scale is measuring a multi-dimen-
sional trait. Gurin, Gurin, Lao, and Beattie (1969) 
factor analyzed responses of 1965 black college students 
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to an extended I-E scale. Four factors were extracted: 
(1) Control Ideology (the person's belief about how much 
control most people in society possess); (2) Person Con-
trol (the individual's belief in his personal control); 
(3) System Modifiability or Blame (the degree the person 
believes the system can be modified); and (4) Race Ideol-
ogy (the individual's belief in collective action, pos-
sibility of making changes in discrimination practices, 
system vs. individual blame and racial militancy). 
While Gurin's four factors may not generalize be-
yond blacks, Mirels' (1970) research cross-validates two 
of these factors. Mirels has suggested two basic inde-
pendent factors: (1) belief in mastery over the course 
of one's life and (2) belief concerning the extent the 
individual has impact on political and societal institu-
tions. These two factors appear to be similar to Gurin's 
Personal Control and System Modifiability. 
The importance of this two factor approach is that 
it can reflect more accurately the sources of influence on 
"locus of control," with the second factor reflecting 
societal expectancies and the first more personal ones. 
Gurin and others (1969) have questioned whether 
or not it would be more functional for disadvantages groups 
to have an internal orientation. They have in fact stated 
that members of these groups with an internal orientation 
would tend to support the status quo, while more external 
10 
members (on the second factor) would tend to opt for 
social change. 
This hypothesis of Gurin and her associates is 
supported by Lao (1970) who gathered data on 1,493 black 
male college students from the Deep South. She found that 
an internal belief in personal control is positively re-
lated to general competence and that an external belief 
in ideology which blames the system for black disad-
vantages is positively related to innovative behavior as 
evidenced by participation in the civil rights movement. 
In addition to this Lao showed that the personal and ideo-
logical factors are independent of each other. 
In response to these multidimensional findings, 
Phares (1976) concluded that while there was some com-
monality in the conclusion of various researchers regard-
ing the dimensionality if I-E, there was much disagreement. 
He argued that there was little evidence that such sub-
factors produce empirically different predictions. 
To summarize, the research indicates that social 
factors play a significant role in control expectations, 
with membership in socially disadvantaged groups corre-
lating positively with externality. In addition to this 
and despite the above-mentioned argument of Phares, it 
seems that further investigation of a two-factor locus of 
control construct may lead to improved predictions. 
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Crises and Locus of Control 
Finally, crisis events such as a divorce, death of 
a loved one, or other misfortune may account for another 
portion of control orientation. While there has not been 
much research in this area, two studies seem relevant. 
McArthur (1970) found that young men who received low 
numbers in the draft lottery shifted to more external ori-
entations. Another study (Gorman, 1968) found that under-
graduates scored in a more external direction following 
the 1968 Democratic Convention. A large portion of the 
students had been McCarthy supporters and as a result were 
quite disillusioned. 
Locus of Control and Maladjustment 
Several studies have dealt with control orienta-
tion as a measure of emotional adjustment. Distefano, 
Pryer, and Smith (1971) administered the I-E scale to 
normal adolescents, psychiatric patients, and normal 
adults. They found that there was a significant linear 
relationship of increasing internality as a function of 
increasing age in the adolescent group. In addition to 
this, they noted that the psychiatric group scores were 
more extreme in either direction than those of the adult 
group. The authors suggest that perception of control is 
relevant to both normal development and emotional adjust-
ment. 
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The research of Smith, Pryer, and Distefano (1971) 
also indicates the relationship between emotional adjust-
ment and locus of control. They compared the I-E scores 
with behavioral ratings of thirty mildly and thirty se-
verely emotionally disturbed hospitalized psychiatric 
patients. The authors found that the severely emotionally 
impaired patients were significantly more external than 
the mildly disturbed patients. 
A similar study by Lottman and DeWolfe (1972) 
found that process schizophrenics (a poor premorbid ad-
justment) were significantly more external than reactive 
schizophrenics (good premorbid adjustment) • The authors 
suggest that these differences in expectancies to be a 
function of long-term learning and not simply current 
symptoms. 
While severity of psychopathology appears to be 
related to externality as suggested by Shybut (1968) , 
other studies have indicated that not all diagnostic 
groups are externals. 
Harrow and Terrante (1969) administered the 
Rotter scale to a group of psychiatric patients during the 
first week of their hospitalization and again after six 
weeks. The authors found that the schizophrenic group 
was significantly more external than the other groups. 
At the other extreme, the manic group was extremely in-
ternal, with depressives and character disorders scoring 
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between the two extremes. When subjects were retested, 
there was a non-significant shift towards internality in 
the schizophrenic group. There was, however, a signif-
icant shift towards internality in the non-schizophrenic 
groups as well as shift towards more normal locus of 
control (i.e., less extreme internality) with the manic 
group. 
In the above-mentioned study by Distefano and his 
associated (1971), the authors found that when compared 
with a normal group an emotionally disturbed group was 
significantly more external. However, when an alcoholic 
group was compared with normals, they were significantly 
more internal. 
While these differences do not refute Shybut's 
argument that severity of psychopathology is related to 
externality, these differences may indicate that different 
diagnostic groups would require different approaches to 
treatment. However, the bulk of the literature has focused 
primarily on the effects of externality and on methods of 
helping people to become more internal. 
Kish, Solberg, and Vecker (1971) found among hos-
pitalized psychiatric patients that internal patients per-
ceived the ward as more supportive, practical, affiliative, 
involving, clear in its expectations, and allowing more 
patient autonomy than the external patients. The authors 
believe that psychiatric hospitals tend to take over the 
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patient's initiative and that, after a long stay in the 
hospital, the patient tends to feel as if he or she has 
little or no control over his or her destiny. However, 
those patients who feel that their initiatives pay off 
are more likely to leave the hospital. 
To summarize, the research is fairly consistent 
indicating that people are handicapped by an external 
orientation. Internals tend to engage in more instru-
mental goal-directed behavior, while externals generally 
manifest emotional nongoal-directed responses. 
Change in Locus of Control 
Several studies have important implications for 
psychotherapy. The research indicates that internals are 
more resistent to manipulation from the environment if 
they are aware of such manipulations. Externals, on the 
other hand, expect control from the outside world and 
therefore are less resistive (Bionde and MacDonald, 1971; 
Doctor, 1971; Getter, 1966; Strickland, 1970). 
In a study by Lefcourt and Ladwig (1965b) the 
authors found that the behavior on the part of persons 
maintaining external control expectancies could be altered 
if new goals could be cognitively linked to whatever prior 
success such persons had. 
In a second study Lefcourt (1967) found that ex-
ternal control subjects exhibited a marked increase in 
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internal control when informed that achievement reinforce-
ment was available. Lefcourt suggested that lack of goal 
striving was due to externals being less perceptive than 
internals. He further stated that by learning what cues 
were linked with reinforcement possibilities, an individual 
could learn to generalize reward-gaining behavior to new 
situations. 
These hypotheses are supported to a degree by 
Smith (1970) who found that clients who went through a 
crisis intervention program in which they had to learn to 
solve their own problem became more internal than a com-
parable group going through traditional psychotherapy. 
Even more direct support of Lefcourt's arguments 
comes from Dua (1970), who contrasted the effects on I-E 
of an action-oriented approach directed at improving in-
terpersonal skills with are-educativetherapy approach. 
The action-oriented treatment involved planning specific 
behaviors for improving relationships, while the re-
educative approach was directed toward influencing the 
clients attitudes. Dua found that while in comparison to 
an untreated control group both the action-oriented ap-
proach and the re-education approach lead to a decrease in 
externality. However, it was the more action-oriented 
skills training approach which produced the most signif-
icant change. 
One of the things that both the Smith and Dua 
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studies have in common is the action-oriented nature of 
their treatment approaches. One might speculate that if 
clients take a direct and active part in their own treat-
ment, they are likely to attribute treatment gains to them-
selves and thereby become more internal. Some tentative 
support for this hypothesis has indicated the relevance 
of self-attributions in the maintenance of therapeutic 
behavior change (Davison and Valins, 1968, 1969). The 
important point to be made here is that the combination of 
self-attribution with reinforcement may be what changes a 
belief in external control to one of internal control. 
Some Extrapolations: Training 
and Locus of Control 
Human beings are, among other things, social 
animals and a great deal of their reinforcements come 
from their interactions with others. The individual gen-
erally has a strong desire for positive interpersonal re-
lationships. However, despite this strong desire, the in-
dividual does not always get wants he or she wants. Sev-
eral theories have discussed the likely consequences of 
frustration of important need areas. Specifically, social 
learning theory leads to the following prediction: 
When an individual places a high value on a particular 
need area and at the same time has low expectancies 
that more desirable behavior will lead to satisfactions 
in that area, he will typically engage in avoidant be-
haviors • • • failure to be rewarded in a strong need 
area is perceived as punishing. Thus, whether we are 
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talking about a simple expectation for punishment or 
the failure to receive rewards that one values highly, 
the outcome is the same--a very unpleasant affective 
state which the individual will attempt to avoid 
(Phares, 1972, p. 441). 
Of related interest, Beck (1967) states that there 
are three components to depression: (1) construing experi-
ences in a negative way, (2) viewing the self in a negative 
way, and (3) having negative expectations of the future. 
Given this triadic configuration, Beck points out that one 
way of changing the motivational pattern of the individual 
is by changing his cognition. He states that 
As long as he expects a negative outcome from any 
course of action, he is stripped of any internal 
stimulation to do anything. Conversely, when he is 
persuaded that a positive outcome may result from a 
particular endeavor, he may then experience an inter-
nal stimulus to pursue it (p. 236). 
Many theorists think that interpersonal relation-
ships are one of the most basic and crucial areas of human 
functioning (Sullivan, 1953; Horney, 1937; Fromm, 1955; 
and many others). Given the possible universal desire for 
positive interpersonal relationships and the negative con-
sequences of having a low expectation of success in this 
area, the literature on the effects of what is called in-
terpersonal skills training is quite pertinent. 
Carkhuff (1969b) has researched and developed a 
systematic training approach which appears to be not only 
effective but also economic. He states that 
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We can do anything in training that we can do in 
treatment--and more. Training in interpersonal skills 
strikes at the heart of most difficulties in living. 
Systematic training in interpersonal skills affords 
a means of implementing the necessary learning in pro-
gressive gradations of experience which insure the 
success of the learning. In making explicit use of 
all sources of learning--the experiential, the didac-
tic, and the modeling--systematic group training in 
interpersonal skills provides the most effective, eco-
nomical, and efficient means of achieving the individ-
ual growth of the largest number of persons (1969b, 
pp. 130-131). 
Carkhuff's thesis of directly training clients in 
interpersonal skills appears to be in line with the Dua 
(1970) and Smith (1970) studies mentioned above. That is, 
an action-oriented treatment approach which may facilitate 
self-attributed behavior change and leads to increased 
internality. 
Pierce and Drasgow (1969) did a comparative study 
of modes of treatment with neuropsychiatric in-patients. 
The authors found a training group to show significant im-
provement over drug-therapy, group-therapy, and individual-
therapy subjects. After interviewing the patients, they 
discovered that the patients of the ward found those 
patients who received training to be significantly more 
helpful than those patients who had not received training. 
The authors recommended that 
if one wants to create a truly therapeutic atmosphere 
in either group therapy or on the wards, one must 
train the patients, since they do not exist in isola-
tion from each other but rather are a major part of 
each other's environment (p. 298}. 
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In another study (Vitale, 1971), patients' im-
provement in interpersonal functioning was found to be 
significantly greater than that which resulted through 
modeling in group therapy. The training was also found 
to have affected a general improvement in patients' social 
functioning. Based on this evidence, Vitale stated that 
this consistent efficacy in producing improved social 
functioning suggests the present program as a pre-
ferred mode of treatment in instances where the pre-
senting problem is predominantly interpersonal. Fur-
ther, the briefness of the training combined with the 
importance of the skills it transmits suggest it as 
adjunct treatment to all forms of therapeutic inter-
vention (p. 170). 
Several other researchers have found positive ef-
fects of interpersonal skills training with parents (Cark-
huff and Bierman, 1970; Carkhuff and Griffin, 1971), 
prison inmates (Devine and Steinberg, 1974; Montgomery, 
1974), delinquents (Carkhuff, Berenson, Griffin, Devine, 
Angelone, Clinton, Keeling, Muth, Patch and Steinberg, 
1974) and ex-felons (Griffin, 1973). 
The research data seems to indicate that inter-
personal skills training is effective as an adjunct to 
traditional modes of treatment if not a preferred mode of 
treatment itself. 
Finally, with a normal population, Egan (1976) 
has developed a human relations training model similar to 
Carkhuff's and directly related to the possibility of 
changes in control expectancies. In fact, it is Egan's 
thesis that: 
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increasing your interpersonal skills can make you 
less vulnerable to random social influence for a 
number of reasons. Skills training gives you a 
greater sense of competence and increases your self-
esteem. You become less dependent and freed at least 
to a degree, from the need for social approval. You 
also acquire the ability to challenge untoward at-
tempts at influence in your regard. On the other 
hand, learning communication skills can open you up 
to more reasonable kinds of social influence. You 
can listen more carefully to what others have to say 
and with greater understanding. You are less defen-
sive and therefore more willing to listen (p. 243). 
The research on skills training and the studies 
on changes in locus of control appear to have a point of 
convergence. It seems highly likely that what is needed 
to help change an external to an internal is to show them 
that reinforcement is not up to luck but that it is con-
tingent, in part, upon what they do. Systematically 
training individuals in those skills which they need to 
deal effectively with their environment seems to be a 
direct way to change externals into internals. By equip-
ping external subjects with interpersonal skills, we are 
doing several things. One, with new skills, they are 
likely to have better interpersonal relationships and 
this is likely to enhance their sense of self-esteem and 
self-worth. Secondly, these more positive consequences 
are likely to further enhance, reinforce, and maintain the 
subjects' newly increased behavioral repetoire. Thirdly, 
as both Rotter (1966) and Lefcourt (1967) have pointed 
out, externals seem to be relatively unaware of rein-
forcement contingencies. However, with skills training, 
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social cues are made more explicit and as a result ex-
ternals can "see" the path to social reinforcement and 
their expectancies are likely to change (Lefcourt, 1967) • 
Purpose of the Study 
The present study attempts to probe the relation-
ship between behavior change and personality change. 
Specifically, the role of I-E on level of interpersonal 
skills will be examined, as well as, the effect of in-
creased interpersonal functioning on belief in control. 
Specific Hypotheses 
1. Subjects in a human relations training class 
(experimental condition) will show a significant increase 
in interpersonal skills as measured by a behavioral rating 
scale based on the work of Egan (1976) and Carkhuff 
( 1969b) • 
2. Subjects under the experimental condition will 
become significantly more internal than control-group sub-
jects. 
3. At pretest, the external subjects will have a 
significantly lower level of interpersonal skills than in-
ternal subjects. 
4. At posttest, the internal subjects will show 
a greater increase (over pretest level) in interpersonal 
skills than the external subjects. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects were 83 students who enrolled into one 
of three evening psychology courses: Psychology 378--
Laboratory in Interpersonal Relations; Psychology 380--
Statistics I; and Psychology 331--Abnormal Psychology. 
There were 27 male subjects ranging in age from 20 to 55 
years with 14 to 24 years of formal education. There 
were 56 female subjects ranging in age from 19 to 53 years 
with 14 to 18 years of formal education. 
The students were classified as being either 
Experimental or Control subjects depending on in which 
course they enrolled. Those subjects enrolling in the 
human relations training course (Psychology 378) were 
designated as the Experimental group, while those subjects 
who enrolled in the two remaining academic courses con-
stituted the Control group. 
The subjects were further classified along the 
I-E continuum into three personality groups. Those sub-
jects scoring in the lowest third on the Rotter scale 
(1966) were classified as Internals (0 to 6 on the Rotter), 
those scoring in the middle third were classified as 
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Moderates (7 to 10 on the Rotter) and those receiving the 
highest scores were classified as Externals (11 to 21 on 
the Rotter) • 
The subjects were thus classified into one of two 
conditions (Experimental or Control) and into one of three 
personality groups (Internal, Moderate, or External) • 
Further Description of the 
Sample Groups 
Experimental Group: 45 subjects enrolled in the 
human relations training course (15 males and 30 females). 
EXPERIMENTAL GROUP 
(n=45) 
Males Females All Subjects 
(n=3) (n=l2) 
mean 33.67 23.80 26.93 
Age 
s.d. 18.50 5.03 9.78 
Internal 
(n=l5) mean 16.00 15.38 15.80 
Education 
s.d. 1.25 1.27 1.42 
Males Females All Subjects 
(n=6) (n=9) 
mean 28.17 22.22 24.60 
Age 
s.d. 10.23 3.11 7.21 
Moderate 
(n=l5) mean 15.83 14.78 15.20 
Education S.d. .93 • 97 1.08 
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Males Females All Subjects 
(n=6) (n=9) 
mean 25.67 23.44 24.33 
Age 
s.d. 7.55 3.91 5.51 
External 
(n=lS) mean 15.83 15.72 15.77 
Education 
s.d. 1.47 1.30 1.32 
Control Grou:12: 38 subjects enrolled in the two 
academic courses (26 females and 12 males) • 
CONTROL GROUP 
(n=38) 
Males Females All Subjects 
(n=4) (n=4) 
mean 35.50 24.50 30.00 
Age 
s.d. 5.45 3.70 7.29 
Internal 
(n=8) mean 18.50 15.75 17.13 
Education 
s.d. 4.36 .so 3.23 
Males Females All Subjects 
(n=4) (n=4) 
mean 24.00 26.00 25.00 
Age 
s.d. 3.16 1.41 2.51 
Moderate 
(n=8) mean 15.00 15.25 15.13 
Education 
s.d. 1.15 .96 .99 
Males Females All Subjects 
(n=4) (n=l8) 
mean 31.75 25.50 26.64 
Age 
s.d. 6.85 7.68 7.78 
External 
(n=22) mean 15.50 15.49 15.49 
Education 
s.d. 1.73 1.24 1.30 
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Instruments 
The primary measuring instrument used for the study 
was the I-E scale developed by Rotter (1966) to assess the 
individual's reinforcement orientation. It consists of 23 
question pairs plus six filler questions, and uses a 
forced-choice format. Some examples are: "Many of the un-
happy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck." 
or "People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they 
make." and "It is hard to know whether or not a person 
really likes you." or "How many friends you have depends on 
how nice a person you are." This questionnaire is shown 
in Appendix D. This scale was used as the pretest and 
posttest instrument for the Experimental and Control 
groups. 
Another measuring instrument, a five point be-
havioral rating scale, was used as a second pretest and 
posttest instrument with the Experimental group only. 
The scale was used to assess nine basic interpersonal 
skills. (See Egan, 1976 and Carkhuff 1969b.) The mean 
of the scale, 3.0, refers to minimally effective level of 
interpersonal functioning. Scores below 3.0 are indic-
ative of less effectiveness and greater interpersonal dis-
organization while scores above 3.0 are indicative of a 
higher level of interpersonal effectiveness. This scale 
is shown in Appendix C. In addition to this, a copy of 
Carkhuff's scoring norms (1969, pp. 315-329) is shown in 
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Appendix as well as an example rating guide (Appendix B) • 
Procedures 
The experimenter administered the I-E scale to all 
subjects during the first and last meeting of their re-
spective classes. Subjects were told that the experi-
menter was gathering data on people's attitudes and be-
liefs. They were instructed to answer all questions, that 
there were no right or wrong answers, and to indicate 
which statement of the forced-choice pair that they agreed 
with most. 
After the first meeting of their class, the ex-
perimental subjects were assigned to their permanent small 
training groups of 5 to 7 members with one or two trainers. 
To control for differences in trainers' style and skills, 
equal numbers of internal, moderate, and external sub-
jects were randomly assigned to each of the permanent small 
groups. 
The training received by the experimental subjects 
consisted of both didactic instruction in the form of lec-
tures and experiential step-by-step practice in the nine 
basic interpersonal skills discussed by Egan (1976). The 
subjects moved from practicing simple listening skills in 
dyads and triads to the development of more complex inter-
personal skills (confrontation, immediacy, etc.) within the 
context of an open group (see Egan 1976, 1975b). In 
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addition to this, the subjects read materials on the skills 
and did pertinent workbook assignments (Egan 1975b, 1976 
and Wood, 1974) • 
The trainers of each of the small groups made an 
assessment of the subject's interpersonal skills, as de-
lineated by the behavioral rating scale, after the first 
and last meeting of the small training groups. All trainers 
made independent evaluations and were blind to the subjects 
I-E scale scores as well as the hypotheses of the study. 
During this same time period, the control group 
received no further contact from the experimenter and none 
of these subjects went through any program designed to im-
prove interpersonal skills. 
At the end of the semester, all subjects were re-
tested with the same I-E scale. Prior to taking this 
posttest, none of the subjects knew that they would be 
asked to retake the questionnaire they had taken earlier 
as a pretest. There was a 14 week time lapse between the 
pretest and posttest for both groups. 
Scoring 
Both pretest and posttest I-E scales were scored 
according to a standard answer key (Rotter, 1966) I-E 
scores for each subject was obtained by counting the num-
ber of external responses indicated. 
Both pretest and posttest interpersonal skills 
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scores were based on trainers' ratings of the experimental 
subjects' skills. Each of the small group trainers rated 
the skills of the members of their respective groups. In 
those groups having two trainers, the trainers were in-
structed to make independent assessments of members' 
skills. Since the trainers were familiar with the Cark-
huff and Egan assessment procedures, no special training 
was given to them for this study. They were simply asked 
to rate subjects' interpersonal skills according to the 
method shown in Appendix B. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Analysis of I-E Data 
In order to determine if a significant change in 
I-E occurred as a result of the training received by the 
experimental group, the I-E change scores were subjected 
to an analysis of variance unweighted means solution 
(Winer, 1971). Results of the analysis of variance for 
the I-E data are shown in Table 1. The factor A main 
effect is non-significant (F (1,77)=1.63, p=.25), in-
dicating that the Experimental and Control groups do not 
differ significantly with respect to their changes in 
level of I-E. The factor B main effect is also non-sig-
nificant (F (2,77)=1.46, p=.25). This shows that the 
Internal, Moderate, and External groups do not signif-
icantly differ with respect to changes in their level of 
I-E. However, the AB interaction is significant 
(F (2,77=4.97, p=.Ol) and this indicates a significant 
interaction between condition (Experimental vs. Control) 
and level of I-E (Internal, Moderate, and External). 
The nature of the interaction effects is indicated 
by inspecting the cell means of the I-E change scores in 
Table 2. A graphic representation of this interaction is 
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Table 1 
Analysis of Variance of I-E Change Scores 
(Unweighted Means Solution) 
Source of Variation ss df MS F 
A (Exp. vs. Con.) 16.11 1 16.11 1.63 
B ( Int-Mod-Ext) 28.94 2 14.47 1.46 
AB 98.21 2 49.11 4.97 
Within Subjects 761.13 77 9.88 
(N=83) 
.25 
.25 
.01 
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Table 2 
Mean I-E Pretest, Post test 
Experimental 
(N=45) 
Control 
(N=38) 
Internal 
Moderate 
External 
Internal 
Moderate 
External 
N 
15 
15 
15 
8 
8 
22 
Pretest 
4.40 
8.47 
14.53 
4.38 
8.25 
13.36 
and Change Scores 
Posttest 
6.20 
6.80 
12.60 
3.88 
9.63 
13.50 
Change 
+1.80 
-1.67 
-1.93 
-0.50 
+1.38 
+0.14 
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given in Figure 1. This figure represents the profile 
corresponding to the simple effects of condition (factor A) 
for each of the levels of I-E (factor B). An equivalent 
graph of the cell means is given in Figure 2. This figure 
represents the profile corresponding to the simple effects 
of I-E (factor B) for the two levels of condition (factor 
A) • 
In order to probe this interaction, an analysis 
of variance for simple effects was performed (Winer, 
1971) • The analysis of variance for simple effects of 
condition (Experimental vs. Control) for each level of 
I-E is summarized in Table 3. The data indicates a non-
significant difference (F (1,77)=3.24, p=.lO) between 
conditions for the Internal group; a significant differ-
ence (F (1,77)=5.70, p=.OS) between conditions for the 
Moderate group, and a non-significant difference 
(F (1,77)=2.62, p.=.25) between conditions for the Ex-
ternal group. More simply, the data indicates that the 
only significant effect due to condition occurred in the 
Moderate I-E group. By inspection of the cell means 
(Table 2) , it can be seen that the Experimental Moderate 
group shifted as predicted in an internal direction. 
Paradoxically, the factor A main effect while not sig-
nificant does approach significance at the .10 level. 
What is paradoxical here is, that by inspection of the 
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+2 
B2 (Moderate) 
+1 
B3 (External) 
0 
Bl (Internal) 
-1 / 
""' 
-2 
Al Experimental A2 Control 
Figure 1. Profile of Simple Effects for Condition 
/ 
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Figure 2. Profile of Simple Effects for I-E 
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Table 3 
Analysis of Variance for Simple Effects for I-E 
Source of Variation ss df MS F 
A for b1 
(Condition for Internals) 31.97 1 31.97 3.24 .10 
A for b2 
(Condition for Moderates) 56.31 1 56.31 5.70 .05 
A for b3 
(Condition for Externals) 25.92 1 25.92 2.62 .25 
Within Cell 761.13 77 9.88 
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cell means (Table 2) it can be seen that the Internal Ex-
perimental group moved towards a more external direction. 
These data while non-significant are opposite of the pre-
dicted direction of change. 
A second analysis of variance of simple effects 
was performed and these results are summarized in Table 4. 
These data deal with the simple effects of I~E on Condi-
tion. The data indicate a significant difference 
(F (2,77)=5.31, p=.Ol) in changes in I-E between the 
I-E groups under the experimental condition. However, 
there was no significant difference (F (2,77)=1.12, 
p=N.S.) in changes in I-E between the I-E groups under 
the control condition. In other words, the only signif-
icant change in I-E occurred in the I-E groups under the 
Experimental condition. And while all of these changes 
were not in the predicted direction, as stated above, 
skills training apparently resulted in significant changes 
in I-E. 
Inter-Judge Reliability for 
Skills Data 
Mean skills scores for the seven trianing groups 
having two rater-trainers are shown in Table 5. When com-
parison data for these groups was ordered according to the 
scoring categories in Appendix B, the inter-judge reli-
ability based on the Spearman rho statistic (Guilford, 
1956) ranged from .43 to .90 with a mean correlation of 
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Table 4 
Analysis of Variance for Simple Effects for Each Condition 
Source of Variation ss df MS F 
B for a 1 (I-E for 
Experimental Condition) 104.99 2 52.50 5.31 .01 
B for a 2 (I-E for the 
Control Condition) 22.04 2 11.02 1.12 
Within Cell 761.13 77 9.88 
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Table 5 
Inter-Judge Comparison of Mean Ratings for Pretest and 
Posttest Interpersonal Skills Rating (N=33) 
Small Group Pretest Post test 
Rater 1 Rater 2 Rater 1 Rater 2 
I (N=6) 2.95 3.04 3.11 2.72 
Rater 3 Rater 4 Rater 3 Rater 4 
II (N=5) 2.88 2.94 4.09 4.33 
Rater 5 Rater 6 Rater 5 Rater 6 
III (N=4) 2.87 2.99 3.72 3.53 
Rater 7 Rater 8 Rater 7 Rater 8 
IV (N=5) 2.17 2.97 2.68 4.16 
Rater 9 Rater 10 Rater 9 Rater 10 
v (N=4) 2.25 2.22 3.31 3.53 
Rater 11 Rater 12 Rater 11 Rater 12 
VI (N=4) 3.05 2.81 3.49 3.46 
Rater 13 Rater 14 Rater 13 Rater 14 
VII (N=5) 3.39 3.73 3.56 3.60 
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.72 for the seven training groups (see Table 6). Ac-
cording to Carkhuff's (1969b) research, an inter-judge 
reliability of .72 would not be considered as highly re-
liable. Carkhuff's raters usually obtain an inter-judge 
reliability at or above .85 (Cannon and Carkhuff, 1969). 
However, Table 6 indicates that five of the seven rho 
correlations were significant at the .01 level, and that 
the mean correlation of .72 was significant to the .05 
level. Taken as a whole, the data indicate fairly good 
inter-judge reliability. 
Analysis of Skills Data 
In order to obtain a single pretest and a single 
posttest skill score for all experimental subjects, the 
ratings of those subjects having two trainers were aver-
aged and the mean score designated as their skill score. 
The final skill score means and standard deviations for 
the three I-E groups are shown in Table 7. 
To determine if a significant change in inter-
personal skills occurred as a result of skills training, 
the pretest and posttest skills scores for the three ex-
perimental I-E groups were subjected to a repeated mea-
sures analysis of variance (Winer, 1971). The results of 
the analysis of variance for the skills data are shown in 
Table 8. The factor A main effect value is non-signif-
icant (F (2,42)=1.35, p=N.S.) indicating that the three 
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Table 6 
Small Training Groups Inter-Judge Reliability for Pretest 
and Posttest Interpersonal Skills Rating (N=33) 
Small Group 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
v 
VI 
VII 
Range .43--.90 
Mean Rho .72 .OS 
Rho 
.43 
.82 
• 90 
.80 
.48 
.88 
.75 
N 
NS 6 
.01 5 
.01 4 
.01 5 
NS 4 
.01 4 
.01 5 
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TABLE 7 
Mean Scores for Pretest and Posttest Interpersonal Skills 
and Standard Deviations (N=45) 
Group Pretest Post test 
Internal X 2.64 3.36 
(N=lS) SD .28 .43 
Moderate X 3.00 3.58 
(N=lS) SD .44 .70 
External x 2.94 3.42 
(N=lS) SD • 76 .71 
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Table 8 
Analysis of Variance of Pretest and Posttest Interpersonal 
Skills Scores (N=45) 
Source ss df MS F 
A (I-E Groups) 1.30 2 .65 1.35 NS 
Subjects within 
Groups 20.36 42 .48 
B (Pre-Post) 7.92 1 7.92 41.68 .001 
AB .23 2 .12 .63 NS 
Bx Subjects 8.10 42 .19 
Within Groups 
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I-E groups (Internal, Moderate, and External) do not dif-
fer significantly with respect to their interpersonal 
skills. The factor B main effect is highly significant 
(F (1,42)=7.92, p=.OOl) indicating that, a highly sig-
nificant change in ability to communicate occurred be-
tween the pretest and the posttest. While this change was 
highly significant, the AB interaction (F (2,42=.12, 
p=N.S.) was not significant. This indicates that there 
was no significant interaction between change in ability 
to communicate and belief in control. The change in in-
terpersonal skills which the factor B main effect indi-
cates therefore occurred independent of the control ori-
entation of the subjects. Apparently, the three groups 
did not differ in their improvement in interpersonal 
skills. 
Summary of Results 
An anlaysis of variance performed on the I-E 
change scores of the experimental and control subjects 
indicated a significant interaction between condition 
and I-E. To probe this interaction, two analyses of vari-
ance for simple effects were performed. The results 
showed that the only significant changes in I-E occurred 
under the experimental condition and that those changes 
consisted of a significant shift towards internality in 
the moderate I-E group, no significant change in the 
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external I-E group, and a shift, which approached signif-
icance, in the internal I-E group in the external direc-
tion. 
A second analysis of variance performed on the 
pretest and posttest skills scores of the experimental 
subjects indicated that a highly significant improvement 
in interpersonal skills occurred between testings in all 
three I-E groups. 
Thus, while the first hypothesis of this study was 
confirmed and the second hypothesis was partially supported, 
the third and fourth hypothesis were not confirmed. More 
specifically, these results are summarized according to 
the hypotheses of this study as follows: 
1. Participants in a human relations (experi-
mental condition) training program showed a significant 
increase in their interpersonal skills. 
2. While subjects under the experimental condi-
tion made significant changes in I-E, only the moderate 
I-E group made a significant shift towards internality, 
with the external I-E group showing no change and the in-
ternal I-E group showing a non-significant trend in the 
external direction. 
3. At pretest, the external group of experimental 
subjects did not have significantly lower interpersonal 
skills than the internal group of experimental subjects. 
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4. At the posttest, the internal group of experi-
mental subjects did not have a significantly greater in-
crease in interpersonal skills than the external group of 
experimental subjects. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Skills Data 
The results of the skills training data confirm 
the first hypothesis of this study, that human relations 
training, as advocated by Egan and Carkhuff, does effect 
a positive increase in experimental subjects' interper-
sonal skills, as measured by trainers' ratings. However, 
these same data fail to confirm the third and fourth 
hypotheses of this study, that there would be a signif-
icant difference in the initial skills level between I-E 
groups as well as in the amount of improvement in skills. 
While Table 8 shows that all three I-E groups are rated 
as having made significant increases in their level of 
interpersonal effectiveness, it also shows that the 
groups did not significantly differ in their initial 
skills level or in their degree of improvement. 
Pretest means in Table 7 also indicate that the 
three I-E groups did not differ significantly in their 
initial level of interpersonal skills (I=2.64; M=3.00; 
E=2.94). Behaviorally, this means that experimental sub-
jects tended to interact with others in the "good advice" 
to the "simple reflective" level of communication. They 
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would, at this level, tend to respond with advice and 
would occasionally communicate minimal understanding to 
others. Posttest means in Table 7 show that this pattern 
of communication changes for all three experimental I-E 
groups (I=3.36; M=3.58; E=3.42). Behaviorally, the ex-
perimental subjects would tend to communicate at or near 
the interchangeable level of communication. At this new 
level, they would be likely to accurately respond to others 
with real warmth and genuine understanding. 
As mentioned above, the third and fourth hypotheses 
of this study were not supported by the data. Several 
factors may have contributed to this failure to find sig-
nificance. It is possible that subtle differences in the 
interpersonal skills of the three I-E groups were not 
detected, while a gross change in overall level of skills 
was. Therefore, failure to detect differences between the 
groups might be an artifact of insensitive instrumentation. 
However, it is also possible that the data accu-
rately reflect a lack of difference between the I-E 
groups. Using Piagetian terminology, Wachtel (1973) has 
argued that normal subjects are more likely to accommodate 
themselves to their environment than are "disturbed" in-
dividuals who are likely to act in an "overassimilated" 
manner. It is therefore possible that for the normal sub-
jects in this study their assimilated belief systems did 
not differentially mediate their interpersonal behavior. 
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Furthermore, given the "demand characteristics" of the 
experimental condition, any personality differences may 
have been washed out by the subjects' accommodations to 
skills training. This is not to say that personality dif-
ferences in interpersonal behavior may not have existed 
between the three groups in non-training situations but 
rather that all three groups adapted to a rather stimu-
lating environment. 
In other words, while it might be fair to assume 
that the increase interpersonal skills would likely lead 
to an overall improvement in the subjects interpersonal 
relationships (see Carkhuff and Berenson, 1976) , this is 
not necessarily the case. It is possible that even though 
all three groups have the same level of skills, if external 
subjects continue to believe that they have little influ-
ence on their environment, they may not use their skills 
in non-training situations. 
However, while there was apparently significant 
improvement in the interpersonal skills of the experi-
mental subjects, due to several design and methodological 
flaws, the validity of these results may be questioned. 
Specifically, because skills data was not collected on the 
control group subjects, it can only be assumed that the 
experimental and control groups were drawn from the same 
population with respect to their level of interpersonal 
skills. Furthermore, it can only be assumed that the 
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control group would not have experienced a comparable 
change in interpersonal skills. Because of this lack of 
data, it is not possible to unequivocally attribute the 
change in level of skills to skills training rather than 
to various confounds such as self-selection. 
Another criticism, that might be made of the 
methodology used, was that the subjects may have been 
taught to take the test. That is, the behavioral scale 
used to evaluate interpersonal skills was constructed to 
pick up what was taught during training. Since the ex-
perimental subjects were trained in the very skills as-
sessed by the behavioral scale, they were expected to and 
actually did show a marked improvement on the posttest. 
While there is some validity to this criticism, 
Carkhuff (1969a,b) has shown that the skills measured by 
his scales actually are observable in the subjects' real 
interactions with others. In other words, Carkhuff's 
scales appear to validly measure skills that are trans-
ferred to real life situations as a result of training. 
Thus, it can be argued that Carkhuff's scales provide a 
valid assessment of the effectiveness of training. 
A more serious problem with the skills data has 
to do with scoring. While the trainers were unaware of 
the specific hypotheses of this study, they did know that 
they were making pretest and posttest assessments. There-
fore, as raters familiar with this approach, they probably 
so 
were aware that an increase in skills would be expected. 
Furthermore, as trainers of the very groups that they were 
rating, one may validly argue that the trainers may have 
been biased--the trainers might have a personal invest-
ment in seeing improvement in their trainees' skills. In 
other words, the only improvement in the subjects' inter-
personal skill may have been in the minds of the trainer-
raters. While this is a valid argument, and while having 
trainers rate their own groups may compromise the validity 
of the results of this study--the interjudge reliability 
data tends to support the validity of these results. 
Specifically, in five of the seven training groups (see 
Tables S and 6) the Spearman rank order correlations were 
significant at the .01 level with the mean rho correlation 
of .72 for the seven groups being significant at the .OS 
level. While this level of reliability indicates fairly 
good agreement between independent trainer assessments, 
which would tend to indicate that the data was validly 
reflecting actual change in social skills, it does not 
eliminate the possible role of trainer bias. 
In conclusion, because of several design and 
methodological flaws of the study, the validity of the 
skills training data is in question. Although a very sig-
nificant increase in interpersonal skills was found, these 
results can only be considered as suggestive. However, 
many better designed studies sighted above from the 
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literature have indicated the validity and effectiveness 
of the skills training approach. Therefore while the con-
founds of this study compromise the validity of the noted 
improvement of the subjects' skills, the established ef-
fectiveness of the skills training approach (see Carkhuff 
and Berenson, 1976) provides a background of support for 
that improvement. 
I-E Data 
The results of the I-E data indicate that skills 
training does have a significant effect on I-E. Table 4 
shows that the experimental subjects made significantly 
greater changes in I-E than control subjects. (Although 
these changes in I-E may be attributed to skills train-
ing, .the role of confounds such as self-selection must 
not be forgotten.) While there was significantly greater 
change in I-E under the experimental condition than under 
the control condition, many researchers have indicated 
that treatment can be for either better or worse (Bergin 
and Garfield, 1971; Carkhuff and Berenson, 1976a,b; 
Lieberman, Yalom, and Miles, 1973). Given the potential 
for both loss and gain, the question remains how to evalu-
ate whether these changes in I-E were for better or worse. 
Table 2 shows that these changes were not uni-
directional. That is, while the moderate experimental 
group shifted in an internal direction, the internal 
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experimental subjects shifted in an external direction. 
Given this apparent convergence towards the mean with 
these two groups, it may not be accurate to characterize 
these changes as shifts towards greater internality or 
externality. Rather, it may be more accurate or at least 
more convenient to characterize these changes as movement 
towards a more moderate level of I-E. 
Despite this moderation perspective, the question 
of the value of the I-E changes remains. Several factors 
suggest that the moderation effect was for the better. 
Specifically, the results of the skills data suggests that 
the experimental subjects made significant improvement in 
their interpersonal functioning. Given this apparent im-
provement in interpersonal skills and assuming that the 
corresponding changes in I-E were reflecting this improve-
ment, then it may be argued that the changes in I-E are 
probably for the better. Furthermore, the overall move-
ment of the experimental group, as a whole, was in the 
internal direction, while the internal I-E group, which 
would be least likely to suffer from a shift in the ex-
ternal direction, shifted in an external direction, its 
posttest mean score was still in the internal range (see 
Table 2) • Taken together both the configuration of changes 
in I-E and the apparent improvement in interpersonal skills 
support the interpretation that the moderation effect of 
the experimental subjects was for the better. 
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Phenomenologically, as a result of skills training 
with its focus on interpersonal behavior and its conse-
quences, internals may have come to believe that while 
they could have a positive influence on others, they did 
not exercise as much control or influence as they might 
have previously thought. For the moderate subjects, the 
moderation shift would probably mean that they came to 
believe that they had greater influence on others than they 
did prior to skills training. In other words, two of the 
three experimental groups may have been moving towards the 
belief that while they could have a genuine influence on 
their environment, that influence was only partial. 
While the moderation effect appears to provide 
support for the second hypothesis of this study, data 
from Table 3 tends to limit the amount of that support. 
Table 3 indicates a differential responsiveness among the 
three I-E groups. Specifically, only the moderate per-
sonality group made a significant change in I-E {F {1,77}= 
5.70, p=.OS) while the internal group (F {1,77}=3.24, 
p=.lO} and the external group {F (1,77}=2.62, p=.25} did not 
Despite the fact that all three I-E groups ap-
parently went through a sighificant improvement in inter-
personal skills and that there was no significant differ-
ence in level of interpersonal functioning--only the mod-
erate I-E group revised their beliefs in control to a 
significant degree. 
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From inspection of Table 2, it can be seen that 
the posttest mean I-E scores of the internal and mod-
erate experimental groups approach identity (6.20 and 
6.80 respectively}. Given this apparent convergence in 
beliefs between the internal and moderate experimental 
groups and based on a moderation interpretation, it can 
be argued that the internal subjects needed to make less 
of a change in I-E to bring their belief system in line 
with a more moderate level of expectation. However, 
while the external group made a change in interpersonal 
behavior comparable to both the externals and moderates 
(Table 7} , they did not make a comparable change in I~E 
(Table 2} • 
While the reasons for failure to find a signif-
icant change in I-E in the external group are not clear, 
there are several possible explanations for this lack of 
change. Spiegel has suggested that a "ripple effect" 
occurs when an individual after experiencing mastery in 
one area of his or her life, feels motivated to start 
making significant changes in other areas of their lives 
(Spiegel and Linn, 1969}. The literature has indicated 
that people with an internal vs. external orientation 
differ in the number of areas in which they believe them-
selves to be effective. Therefore, given the fact that, 
by definition, external subjects probably feel less ef-
fective in more areas of their lives than either moderate 
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or internal subjects and that for a "ripple effect" to 
occur sufficient time has to elapse, it is possible that 
at the time of the posttest, a sufficient amount of time 
had not elapsed for the external subjects to generalize an 
increased sense of mastery. In other words, given a lag 
between behavior change and resultant personality change 
it may take externals longer to change I-E because they 
have more situations to generalize their new level of 
skills to than either internals or moderates. 
Another possible explanation for a lack of sig-
nificant change in I-E may be due to "dynamic" reasons. 
According to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), 
if an individual behaves in a way that conflicts with his 
belief and if there is insufficient external justifica-
tion for the behavior, then he or she will experience 
dissonance and feel motivated to change his or her be-
liefs to conform with his or her behavior. It is pos-
sible that despite significant behavior change external 
subjects may have been able to rationalize this change 
and may not have felt motivated to change their beliefs. 
A related "dynamic" reason for failure to find sig-
nificant change in belief with the external group might be 
due to "resistance." Davis (1970) distinguished between 
two groups of external subjects--"defensive externals" 
and "congruent externals." The former group while es-
pousing an external belief act like internals, while the 
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latter group's behavior coincides with their external 
expectancy. Davis suggests that the "defensive external" 
apparently while striving for success like an internal 
defend themselves against responsibility for failure by 
espousing an external belief. It therefore seems poss-
ible that another factor involved in not finding a sig-
nificant change in I-E with the external subjects, des-
pite their significant change in social skills, might be 
their resistance to acknowledging greater responsibility 
for possible failures. 
Carkhuff (Carkhuff and Berenson, 1976) has sug-
gested that while interpersonal skills are important, 
they may be insufficient to help some people to fully 
develop their human potential. He recommends training 
in other areas of life such as physical and intellectual 
skills development. This is in line with Lazarus' (1976) 
multi-modal hypothesis that the more modalities that are 
incorporated into a treatment program, the better the 
outcome. 
What the data may be indicating is that skills 
training may be insufficient to lead to a significant 
change in I-E with external subjects. What might be 
needed to effect significant change in belief for exter-
nal subjects is the incorporation of more cognitive ele-
ments into the training that would facilitate and rein-
force greater "self-attribution." 
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Parenthetically, it might be added that while the 
external group did not make a significant change in I-E 
(F (1,77)=2.62, p=.25), their posttest mean changed in 
the predicted direction. What this non-significant dif-
ference may be reflecting is the relative though insuf-
ficient positive effect of skills training. 
In partial support of the second hypothesis of 
this study, several things may be concluded. Skills train-
ing appears to have had a significant effect on I-E, that 
is, significant behavior change appears to lead to sig-
nificant personality change. While the direction of these 
changes were not all in the predicted direction, some 
were, nonetheless, significant. Furthermore, given that 
skills training resulted in a genuine improvement in inter-
personal functioning and that the configuration of changes 
in I-E reflected this improvement, then it would appear 
that a moderate level of I-E may be more optimal than 
either extremes of internality or externality. However, 
despite these apparent gains--skills training may not be 
sufficient to overcome an external belief system or, at 
least, it may take longer for externals to make a signif-
icant shift in an internal direction than expected. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The data indicates that interpersonal skills 
training resulted in a significant increase in social 
58 
functioning. Furthermore, while skills training ap-
parently resulted in a significant change in I-E, it may 
not be sufficient in overcoming an external belief sys-
tem. Moreover, I-E did not significantly differentiate 
initial skills level or amount of increase in skills. 
Although these results tend to indicate that sig-
nificant behavior change leads to significant personality 
change, because of the quasi-experimental design used as 
well as various confounds of this study, the generali-
zability of these results is limited. If future studies 
use an experimental design and control for confounds, 
the validity of these results can be strengthened. Fur-
theremore, some measure of interpersonal behavior in non-
training situations would also serve to clarify the rela-
tionship between behavior and belief. Finally, the valid-
ity of the moderation interpretation needs to be re-
searched. 
The experimenter would like to suggest that while 
extreme externality may be pathologic in its posture of 
helplessness and avoidance of responsibility, extreme in-
ternality may be potentially pathologic in flaunting 
reality. The most mature position might be to have a 
generally internal locus of control with a slight ad-
mixture of externality and a recognition of uncertainty. 
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APPENDIX A 
* SCALES FOR ASSESSMENT OF INTERPERSONAL FUNCTIONING 
SCALE 1 
EMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING IN INTERPERSONAL 
PROCESSES: A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT 
Level 1 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the first 
person either do not attend or detract significantly from 
the verbal and behavioral expressions of the second person(s) 
in that they communicate significantly less of the second 
person's feelings than the second person has communicated 
himself. 
Examples: The first person communicates no awareness of 
even the most obvious, expressed surface feelings 
of the second person. The first person may be 
bored or uninterested or simply operating from a 
preconceived frame of reference which totally ex-
cluded that of the other person(s). 
In summary, the first person does everything but ex-
press that he is listening, understanding, or being sensitive 
to even the feelings of the other person in such a way to 
detract significantly from the communications of the second 
person. 
Level 2 
While the first person responds to the expressed 
feelings of the second person(s), he does so in such a way 
that he subtracts noticeable affect from the communications 
of the second person. 
Examples: The first person may communicate some awareness 
* 
of obvious surface feelings of the second person, 
but his communications drain off a level of the af-
fect and distort the level of meaning. The first 
person may communicate his own ideas of what may 
From Car.khuff (1969b). 
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be going on, but these are not congruent with the 
expressions of the second person. 
In summary, the first person tends to respond to 
other than what the second person is expressing or indicatin~ 
Level 3 
The expressions of the first person in response to 
the expressed feelings of the second person(s) are essen-
tially interchangeable with those of the second person in 
that they express essentially the same affect and meaning. 
Example: The first person responds with accurate under-
standing of the surface feelings of the second 
person but may not respond to or may misinterpret 
the deeper feelings. 
In summary, the first person is responding so as to 
neither subtract from nor add to the expressions of the 
second person; but he does not respond accurately to how 
that person really feels beneath the surface feelings. 
Level 3 constitutes the minimal level of facilitative inter-
personal functioning. 
Level 4 
The responses of the first person add noticeably to 
the expressions of the second person(s) in such a way as to 
express feelings a level deeper than the second person was 
able to express himself. 
Example: The facilitator communicates his understanding of 
the expressions of the second person at a level 
deeper than they were expressed, and thus enables 
the second person to experience and/or express 
feelings he was unable to express previously. 
In summary, the facilitator's responses add deeper 
feeling and meaning to the expressions of the second person. 
Level 5 
The first person's responses add significantly to 
the feeling and meaning of the expressions of the second 
person(s) in such a way as to (1) accurately express feel-
ings levels below what the person himself was able to express 
or (2) in the event of on going deep self-exploration on the 
second person's part, to be fully with him in his deepest 
moments. 
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Example: The facilitator responds with accuracy to all of 
the person's deeper as well as surface feelings. 
He is "together" with the second person or "tuned 
in" on his wave length. The facilitator and the 
other person might proceed together to explore 
previously unexplored areas of human existence. 
In summary, the facilitator is responding with a 
full awareness of who the other person is and a comprehen-
sive and accurate empathic understanding of his deepest 
feelings. 
SCALE 2 
THE COMMUNICATION OF RESPECT IN INTERPERSONAL 
PROCESSES: A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT 
Level 1 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the first 
person communicate a clear lack of respect (or negative re-
gard) for the second person(s). 
Example: The first person communicates to the second person 
that the second person's feelings and experiences 
are not worthy of consideration or that the second 
person is not capable of acting constructively. 
The first person may become the sole focus of 
evaluation. 
In summary, in many ways the first person communi-
cates total lack of respect for the feelings, experiences, 
and potentials of the second person. 
Level 2 
The first person responds to the second person in 
such a way as to communicate little respect for the feel-
ings, and potentials of the second person. 
Example: The first person may respond mechanically or pas-
sively or ignore many of the feelings of the 
second person. 
In summary, in many ways the first person displays 
a lack of respect or concern for the second person's feel-
ings, experiences, and potentials. 
Level 3 
The first person communicates a positive respect and 
concern for the second person's feelings, experiences, and 
potentials. 
Example: The first person communicates respect and concern 
for the second person's ability to express himself 
and to deal constructively with his life situation. 
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In summary, inmanyways the first person communicates 
that who the second person is and what he does matter to the 
first person. Level 3 constitutes the minimal level of 
facilitative interpersonal functioning. 
Level 4 
The facilitator clearly communicates a very deep 
respect and concern for the second person. 
Example: The facilitator's responses enables the second 
person to feel free to be himself and to experi-
ence being valued as an individual. 
In summary, the facilitator communicates a very deep 
caring for the feelings, experiences, and potentials of the 
second person. 
Level 5 
The facilitator communicates the very deepest re-
spect for the second person's worth as a person and his 
potential as a free individual. 
Example: The facilitator cares very deeply for the human 
potentials of the second person. 
In summary, the facilitator is committed to the 
value of the other person as a human being. 
SCALE 3 
FACILITATIVE GENUINENESS IN INTERPERSONAL 
PROCESSES: A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT 
Level 1 
The first person's verbalizations are clearly unre-
lated to what he is feeling at the moment, or his only gen-
uine responses are negative in regard to the second person(s) 
and appear to have a totally destructive effect upon the 
second person. 
Example: The first person may be defensive in his inter-
action with the second person(s) and this defen-
siveness may be demonstrated in the content of his 
words or his voice quality. Where he is defensive 
he does not employ his reaction as a basis for 
potentially valuable inquiry into the relationship. 
In summary, there is evidence of a considerable dis-
crepancy between the inner experiencing of the first per-
son(s) and his current verbalizations. Where there is no 
discrepancy, the first person's reactions are employed 
solely in a destructive fashion. 
Level 2 
The first person's verbalizations are slightly unre-
lated to what he is feeling at the moment, or when his re-
sponses are genuine they are negative in regard to the sec-
ond person; the first person does not appear to know how to 
employ his negative reactions constructively as a basis for 
inquiry into the relationship. 
Example: The first person may respond to the second per-
son(s) in a "professional" manner that has a re-
hearsed quality or a quality concerning the way a 
helper "should" respond in that situation. 
In summary, the first person is usually responding 
according to his prescribed role rather than expressing what 
he personally feels or means. When he is genuine his re-
sponses are negative and he is unable to employ them as a 
basis for further inquiry. 
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Level 3 
The first person provides no "negative" cues between 
what he says and what he feels, but he provides no positive 
clues to indicate a really genuine response to the second 
person(s). 
Example: The first person may listen and follow the second 
person(s) but commits nothing more of himself. 
In summary, the first person appears to make appro-
priate responses that do not seen insincere but that do not 
reflect any real involvement either. Level 3 constitutes 
the minimal level of facilitative interpersonal functioning. 
Level 4 
The facilitator presents some positive cues indi-
cating a genuine response (whether positive or negative) in 
a nondestructive manner to the second person(s). 
Example: The facilitator's expressions are congruent with 
his feelings, although he may be somewhat hesitant 
about expressing them fully. 
In summary, the facilitator responds with many of 
his own feelings, and there is no doubt as to whether he 
really means what he says. He is able to employ his re-
sponses, whatever their emotional content, as a basis for 
further inquiry into the relationship. 
Level 5 
The facilitator is freely and deeply himself in a 
nonexploitative relationship with the second person(s). 
Example: The facilitator is completely spontaneous in his 
interaction and open to experiences of all types, 
both pleasant and hurtful. In the event of hurt-
ful responses the facilitator's comments are em-
ployed constructively to open a further area of 
inquiry for both the facilitator and the second 
person. 
In summary, the facilitator is clearly being himself 
and yet employing his own genuine responses constructively. 
SCALE 4 
FACILITATIVE SELF-DISCLOSURE IN INTERPERSONAL 
PROCESSES: A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT 
Level 1 
The first person actively attempts to remain de-
tached from the second person(s) and discloses nothing about 
his own feelings or personality to the second person(s), or 
if he does disclose himself, he does so in a way that is not 
tuned to the second person's general progress. 
Example: The first person may attempt, whether awkwardly or 
skillfully to divert the second person's attention 
from focusing upon personal questions concerning 
the first person, or his self-disclosures may be 
ego shattering for the second person(s) and may 
ultimately cause him to lose faith in the first 
person. 
In summary, the first person actively attempts to 
remain ambiguous and an unknown quantity to the second per-
son(s), or if he is self-disclosing, he does so solely out 
of his own needs and is oblivious to the needs of the sec-
ond person(s). 
Level 2 
The first person, while not always appearing 
actively to avoid self-disclosures, never volunteers per-
sonal information about himself. 
Example: The first person may respond briefly to direct 
questions from the client about himself; however, 
he does so hesitantly and never provides more in-
formation about himself than the second person(s) 
specifically requests. 
In summary, the second person(s) either does not ask 
about the personality of the first person, or, if he does, 
the barest minimum of brief, vague, and superficial re-
sponses are offered by the first person. 
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Level 3 
The first person volunteers personal information 
about himself which may be in keeping with the second per-
son's interests, but this information is often vague and in-
dicates little about the unique character of the first per-
son. 
Example: While the first person volunteers personal infor-
mation and never gives the impression that he does 
not wish to disclose more about himself, neverthe-
less, the content of his verbalizations is gen-
erally centered upon his reactions to the second 
person(s) and his ideas concerning their inter-
action. 
In summary, the first person may introduce more ab-
stract, personal ideas in accord with the second person's 
interests, but these ideas do not stamp him as a unique per-
son. Level 3 constitutes the minimum level of facilitative 
interpersonal functioning. 
Level 4 
The facilitator freely volunteers information about 
his personal ideas, attitudes, and experiences in accord 
with the second person's interests and concerns. 
Example: The facilitator may discuss personal ideas in both 
depth and detail, and his expressions reveal him 
to be a unique individual. 
In summary, the facilitator is free and spontaneous 
in volunteering personal information about himself, and in 
so doing may reveal in a constructive fashion quite intimate 
material about his own feelings, and beliefs. 
Level 5 
The facilitator volunteers very intimate and often 
detailed material about his own personality, and in keeping 
with the second person's needs may express information that 
might be extremely embarrassing under different circum-
stances or if revealed by the second person to an outsider. 
Example: The facilitator gives the impression of holding 
nothing back and of disclosing his feelings and 
ideas fully and completely to the second person(s). 
If some of his feelings are negative concerning the 
second person(s), the facilitator employes them 
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constructively as a basis for an open-ended in-
quiry. 
In summary, the facilitator is operating in a con-
structive fashion at the most intimate levels of self-
disclosure. 
SCALE 5 
PERSONALLY RELEVANT CONCRETENESS OR SPECIFICITY 
OF EXPRESSION IN INTERPERSONAL PROCESSES: 
A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT 
Level 1 
The first person leads or allows all discussion with 
the second person(s) to deal only with vague and anonymous 
generalities. 
Example: The first person and the second person discuss 
everything on strictly an abstract and highly in-
tellectual level. 
In summary, the first person makes no attempt to 
lead the discussion into the realm of personally relevant 
specific situations and feelings. 
Level 2 
The first person frequently leads or allows even dis-
cussions of material personally relevant to the second per-
son(s) to be dealt with on a vague and abstract level. 
Example: The first person and the second person may discuss 
the "real" feelings but they do so at an abstract, 
intellectualized level. 
In summary, the first person does not elicit dis-
cussions of most personally relevant feelings and experiences 
in specific and concrete terms. 
Level 3 
The first person at times enables the second per-
son(s) to discuss personally relevant materials in specific 
and concrete terminology. 
Example: The first person will make it possible for the 
discussion with the second person(s) to center 
directly around most things that are personally 
important to the second person(s), although there 
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will continue to be areas not dealt with concretely 
and areas in which the second person does not de-
velop fully in specificity. 
In summary, the first person sometimes guides the 
discussions into consideration of personally relevant spe-
cific and concrete instances, but these are not always fully 
developed. Level 3 constitutes the minimal level of facili-
tative functioning. 
Level 4 
The facilitator is frequently helpful in enabling 
the second person(s) to fully develop in concrete and spe-
cific terms almost all instances of concern. 
Example: The facilitator is able on many occasions to guide 
the discussion to specific feelings and experi-
ences of personally meaningful material. 
In summary, the facilitator is very helpful in en-
abling the discussion to center around specific and concrete 
instances of most important and personally relevant feelings 
and experiences. 
Level 5 
The facilitator is always helpful in guiding the dis-
cussion, so that the second person(s) may discuss fluently, 
directly, and completely specific feelings and experiences. 
Example: The first person involves the second person in 
discussion of specific feelings, situations, and 
events, regardless of their emotional content. 
In summary, the facilitator facilitates a direct ex-
pression of all personally relevant feelings and experiences 
in concrete and specific terms. 
SCALE 6 
CONFRONTATION IN INTERPERSONAL PROCESSES: 
A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT 
Level 1 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper 
disregard the discrepancies in the helpee's behavior (ideal 
versus real self, insight versus action, helper versus 
helpee's experiences). 
Example: The helper may simply ignore all helpee discrep-
ancies by passively accepting them. 
In summary, the helper simply disregards all of 
those discrepancies in the helpee's behavior that might be 
fruitful areas for consideration. 
Level 2 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper 
disregard the discrepancies in the helpee's behavior. 
Example: The helper, although not explicitly accepting 
these discrepancies, may simply remain silent con-
cerning most of them. 
In summary, the helper disregards the discrepancies 
in the helpee's behavior, and, thus, potentially important 
areas of inquiry. 
Level 3 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper, 
while open to discrepancies in the helpee's behavior, do not 
relate directly and specifically to these discrepancies. 
Example: The helper may simply raise questions without 
pointing up the diverging directions of the pos-
sible answers. 
In summary, while the helper does not disregard dis-
crepancies in the helpee's behavior, he does not point up 
the directions of these discrepancies. Level 3 constitutes 
the minimum level of facilitative interpersonal functioning. 
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Level 4 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper 
attend directly and specifically to the discrepancies in the 
helpee's behavior. 
Example: The helper confronts the helpee directly and ex-
plicitly with discrepancies in the helpee's be-
havior. 
In summary, the helper specifically addresses him-
self to discrepancies in the helpee's behavior. 
Level 5 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper 
are keenly and continually attuned to the discrepancies in 
the helpee's behavior. 
Example: The helper confronts the helpee with helpee dis-
crepancies in a sensitive and perceptive manner 
whenever they appear. 
In summary, the helper does not neglect any poten-
tially fruitful inquiry into the discrepancies in the 
helpee's behavior. 
SCALE 7 
IMMEDIACY OF RELATIONSHIP IN INTERPERSONAL 
PROCESSES: A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT 
Level 1 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper 
disregard the content and affect of the helpee's expressions 
that have the potential for relating to the helper. 
Example: The helper may simply ignore all helpee communica-
tions, whether direct or indirect, that deal with 
the helper-helpee relationship. 
In summary, the helper simply disregards all of 
those helpee messages that are related to the helper. 
Level 2 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper 
disregard most of the helpee expressions that have the 
potential for relating to the helper. 
Example: Even if the helpee is talking about helping per-
sonnel in general, the helper may, in general, re-
main silent or just not relate the content to him-
self. 
In summary, the helper appears to choose to disre-
gard most of those helpee messages that are related to the 
helper. 
Level 3 
The verbal and behavior expressions of the helper, 
while open to interpretations of immediacy, do not relate 
what the helpee is saying to what is going on between the 
helper and the helpee in the immediate moment. 
Example: The helper may make literal responses to or re-
flections on the helpee's expressions or otherwise 
open-minded responses that refer to no one specif-
ically but that might refer to the helper. 
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In summary, while the helper does not extend the 
helpee's expressions to immediacy, he is not closed to such 
interpretations. Level 3 constitutes the minimum level of 
facilitative interpersonal functioning. 
Level 4 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper 
appear cautiously to relate the helpee's expressions 
directly to the helper-helpee relationship. 
Example: The helper attempts to relate the helpee's re-
sponses to himself, but he does so in a tentative 
manner. 
In summary, the helper relates the helpee's responses 
to himself in an open, cautious manner. 
Level 5 
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper 
relate the helpee's expressions directly to the helper-
helpee relationship. 
Example: The helper in a direct and explicit manner relates 
the helpee's expressions to himself. 
In summary, the helper is not hesitant in making 
explicit interpretations of the helper-helpee relationship.) 
SCALE 8 
HELPEE SELF-EXPLORATION IN INTERPERSONAL 
PROCESSES: A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT 
Level 1 
The second person does not discuss personally rele-
vant material, either because he has had no opportunity to 
do such or because he is actively evading the discussion 
even when it is introduced by the first person. 
Example: The second person avoids any self-descriptions or 
self-exploration or direct expression of feelings 
that would lead him to reveal himself to the first 
person. 
In summary, for a variety of possible reasons the 
second person does not give any evidence of self-exploration. 
Level 2 
The second person responds with discussion to the in-
troduction of personally relevant material by the first per-
son but does so in a mechanical manner and without the dem-
onstration of emotional feelings. 
Example: The second person simply discusses the material 
without exploring the significance or the meaning 
of the material or attempting further exploration 
of that feeling in an effort to uncover related 
feelings or material. 
In summary, the second person responds mechanically 
and remotely to the introduction of personally relevant 
material by the first person. 
Level 3 
The second person voluntarily introduces discussions 
of personally relevant material but does so in a mechanical 
manner and without the demonstration of emotional feeling. 
Example: The emotional remoteness and mechanical manner of 
the discussion give the discussion a quality of 
being rehearsed. 
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In summary, the second person introduces personally 
relevant material but does so without spontaneity or emo-
tional proximity and without an inward probing to discover 
new feelings and experiences. 
Level 4 
The second person voluntarily introduces discussions 
of personally relevant material with both spontaneity and 
emotional proximity. 
Example: The voice quality and other characteristics of the 
second person are very much "with" the feelings 
and other personal materials that are being 
verbalized. 
In summary, the second person introduces personally 
relevant discussions with spontaneity and emotional proximity 
but without a distinct tendency toward inward probing to 
discover new feelings and experiences. 
Level 5 
The second person actively and spontaneously engages 
in an inward probing to discover new feelings and experi-
ences about himself and his world. 
Example: The second person is searching to discover new 
feelings concerning himself and his world even 
though at the moment he may perhaps be doing so 
fearfully and tentatively. 
In summary, the second person is fully and actively 
focusing upon himself and exploring himself and his world. 
APPENDIX B 
* Rating Guide for the Interpersonal Skills Scale 
Sample Statement: "I'm so down and I don't even know why 
••• I mean, I shouldn't be down just 
because ••• (pause) there's just no 
reason for it." 
Response Classification Level Rating 
(refer to above statement for all examples) 
1. Cliche Response: Not related to other's statement. 1.0 
e.g., "I know lots of people who get sad feelings 
too." 
Cliche Response: Somewhat related to other's 
statement. 
e.g., "What do you think causes people to get 
depressed?" 
1.5 
2. Advice Response: Poor advice: no understanding. 2.0 
e.g., "You should think of the good things in 
your life." 
Advice Response: Good advice: no understanding. 2.5 
e.g., "You know what's on your mind. Just say it!" 
3. Interchangeable Response: Simple reflective with 
. understanding shown. 3.0 
e.g., "You're feeling down." 
Interchangeable Response: Complete understanding 
of feeling and message 
of other. 3.5 
e.g., "You're pretty down and you just don't know 
why." 
4. Additive Response: High understanding; beginning 
initiation. 4.0 
e.g., "You can't let yourself think about the 
things that are causing you to feel so bad." 
Additive Response: High Understanding; high 
initiation. 4.5 
e.g., "You're feeling really low ••• you have 
an idea why • • • but its pretty painful to 
think about it." 
* This scale is based on the work of Carkhuff 
(1969b). 
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APPENDIX C 
Interpersonal Skills: * A Rating Scale 
Use the following rating scale to rate interpersonal skills: 
, 
1.0 I 1.5 I 2.0 I 2.5 I 3.0 I 3.5 I 4.0 I 4.5 I 5.0 1 
Very Sub- Moderately Minimally Markedly Extremely 
tractive Subtractive facilita- facilita- Facilita-
tive tive tive 
Self-presentation Skills: 
Self-disclosure: Trainee appropriately discloses him-
self to others with the goal of fostering relationships. 
This is done in a sense of mutuality and emerges from 
the ongoing context of the relationship. 
Concreteness: 
and behavior; 
telling"); he 
instances 
He deals in specific, concrete feelings 
he deals in relevant behavior (not "story-
deals in specific details and specific 
Expression of feeling: He expresses his emotions as 
they arise in a constructive non-manipulative manner; 
directly communicating his feelings. 
Responding Skills: 
Primary Accurate Empathy: Trainee communicates an ac-
curate understanding of the feelings, behavior, and ex-
periences which the other person explicitly communicates. 
He experiences the "world" of the other and communicates 
this understanding. 
Genuineness: He responds in a spontaneous, role-free 
manner. He is assertive in communicating without being 
duly aggressive. 
Respect: (warmth, being "for"): He communicates re-
spect for the other person (especially through his ef-
forts to understand the other person's experience). He 
is unconditional or conditional in his regard as the 
phase and content of the relationship demands. 
* This scale is based on the work of Egan (1976). 
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Challenge Skills: 
Advanced Accurate Empathy: Trainee accurately communi-
cates not only what the other person states and expresses 
but also what he implies or leaves unstated or doesn't 
clearly express. 
Confrontation: He invites the other person to examine 
his behavior and its consequences more carefully; he 
challenges the strengths rather than the weaknesses of 
the other; he points out the discrepancies in the 
other's lifestyle. 
Immediacy: He explores the here-and-now, the relation-
ship between himself and others, in a direct and con-
structive manner. 
APPENDIX D 
THE ROTTER INTERNAL-EXTERNAL LOCUS 
* OF CONTROL SCALE 
Instructions: Please check the alternative that best de-
scribes what happens to you or how you feel. There are no 
right or wrong answers. 
1. A. Children get into trouble because their parents 
punish them too much. 
B. The trouble with most children nowadays is that 
their parents are too easy with them. 
2. A. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are 
partly due to bad luck. 
B. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes 
they make. 
3. A. One of the major reasons why we have wars is be-
cause people don't take enough interest in poli-
tics. 
B. There will always be wars, no matter how hard 
people try to prevent them. 
4. A. In the long run people get the respect they de-
serve in this world. 
B. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes 
unrecognized no matter how hard he tries. 
5. A. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is 
nonsense. 
B. Most students don't realize the extent to which 
their grades are influenced by accidental hap-
penings. 
6. A. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effec-
tive leader. 
B. Capable people who fail to become leaders have 
not taken advantage of their opportunities. 
7. A. No matter how hard you try some people just don't 
like you. 
B. People who can't get others to like them don't 
understand how to get along with others. 
* From Rotter (1966). 
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8. A. Heredity plays the major role in determining 
one's personality. 
B. It is one's experiences in life which determine 
what they're like. 
9. A. I have often found that what is going to happen 
will happen. 
B. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well 
for me as making a decision to take a definite 
course of action. 
10. A. In the case of the well prepared student there 
is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test. 
B. Many times exam questions tend to be so unre-
lated to course work that studying is really 
useless. 
11. A. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work; 
luck has little or nothing to do with it. 
B. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in 
the right place at the right time. 
12. A. The average citizen can have an influence in 
government decisions. 
B. This world is run by the few people in power, 
and there is not much the little guy can do 
about it. 
13. A. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I 
14. 
15. 
16. 
can make them work. 
B. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead be-
cause many things turn out to be a matter of 
good or bad fortune anyhow. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 
A. 
B. 
There are certain people who are just no good. 
There is some good in everybody. 
In my case getting what I want has little or 
nothing to do with luck. 
Many times we might just as well decide what to 
do by flipping a coin. 
Who gets to be boss often depends on who was 
lucky enough to be in the right place first. 
Getting people to do the right thing depends 
upon ability; luck has little or nothing to do 
with it. 
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17. A. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of 
us are the victims of forces we can neither un-
derstand, nor control. 
B. By taking an active part in political and social 
affairs the people can control world events. 
18. A. Most people don't realize the extent to which 
B. 
19. A. 
--B. 
20. A. 
B. 
their lives are controlled by accidental happen-
ings. 
There really is no such thing as "luck." 
One should always be willing to admit mistakes. 
It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes. 
It is hard to know whether or not a person 
really likes you. 
How many friends you have depends upon how nice 
a person you are. 
21. A. In the long run the bad things that happen to us 
are balanced by the good ones. 
B. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of 
ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three. 
22. A. With enough effort we can wipe out political 
corruption. 
B. It is difficult for people to have much control 
over the things politicians do in office. 
23. A. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive 
at the grades they give. 
B. There is a direct connection between how hard I 
study and the grades I get. 
24. A. A good leader expects people to decide for them-
selves what they should do. 
B. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what 
their jobs are. 
25. A. Many times I feel that I have little influence 
over the things that happen to me. 
B. It is impossible for me to believe that chance 
or luck plays an important role in my life. 
26. A. People are lonely because they don't try to be 
friendly. 
B. There's not much use in trying too hard to please 
people, if they like you, they like you. 
27. A. 
B. 
28. A. 
---B. 
29. A. 
B. 
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There is too much emphasis on athletics in high 
school. 
Team sports are an excellent way to build 
character. 
What happens to me is my own doing. 
Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough con-
trol over the direction my life is taking. 
Most of the time I can't understand why politi-
cians behave the way they do. 
In the long run the people are responsible for 
bad government on a national as well as on a 
local level. 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The thesis submitted by Michael J. Banks has been read 
and approved by the following committee: 
James E. Johnson, Ph.D., Director 
Associate Professor, Psychology, Loyola 
Rev. Gerard Egan, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor, Psychology, Loyola 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the 
thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the 
fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and 
that the thesis is now given final approval by the Committee 
with reference to content and form. 
The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. 
